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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
.JOHN P . .JONES,
Plain.tiff and Appellant,

t

vs.
ACME BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC.
and GORDON G. LEE,

Case No.
11171

Defendants and Respondents. )

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Third District Court for
Salt Lake County from a Declaratory .Judgment entered
and filed on the 2nd day of .January, 1968, hy the Honorable Leonard W. Elton.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek reversal of the Declaratory
Judgment entered herein holding that the words "net

1
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worth'' in the Memorandum of Under.standing and
Agreement dated July 22, 196$, meant net worth based
on book value of Acme Building Products, Inc. as of July
1, 1966.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant commenced this action by filing a complaint under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Section
78-33-1 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated (1953) alleging a
di·spute between the parties with respect to various particulars of an agreement dated the 22nd day of July, 1966
(Exhibit 1) and specifically with respect to the value of
the interest pos·sessed by the plaintiff in the defendant
corp·oration, the procedure for determining such value,
and the subsequent payment thereof to the plaintiff. The
defendants admitted the dispute, but alleged there was
no basis therefor, thus framing the issue.
As a result of stipulation by the parties, a hearing
was held on October 10, 1967, befor·e Judge Elton for the
limited purpose of interpreting the words "net worth"
as used in paragraphs 2 and 3 ·of Exhibit 1 which pro·
vide:

'' 2. When the foregoing Releases are secured
and/or the events take place, and it is determin~d
the net worth value applicable to the interest m
Acme Building Products, Inc., now owned by J obn
P. Jones, then J.ohn P. Jones will quit-clai.m.all
right, title, and interes.t in 1said ~cme Bmldmg
Products, Inc., to the said corporation.
"3. As a condition to the afol'esaid Release of
all the interest in the business by John P. Jones,
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1

it is understood and agreed that a financial statement will be first drawn as of July 1, 1966, and
that Gordon Lee and John P. Jones, with the aid
of Jerry Branagan aud Allen E. Mecham, will negotiate a~d. enter into an Agreement whereby
Acme Bmldmg Products, Inc. will agree to pay
.John P. Jones upon terms as set forth by John P.
Jones as a result of said negotiation, the balance
due to him from an accounting which reflects the
net worth of ~he said Acme Building Products,
Inc." (emphasis added)
At the hearing before Judge Elton on October 10,
1967, the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of Exhibit 1 were presented by the parties. Summarizing from the transcript of proceedings, they are as
follows:
John P. Jones, plaintiff and appellant, and Gordon
G. Lee, defendant and respondent, had been the owners
of the defendant corporation, Acme Building Products,
Inc. for a period of ,six and one-third years, each party
owning one-half of the outstanding shares (TR 67, 84).
During the latter part of this period, the parties had
frequent disputes and as a result, they had discussed the
possibility of one ·Or the other parties disassociating from
the business (TR 67-68). These discussions took place
at least once a year, if not oftener (TR 67). In May of
1966, such a meeting took place with Jones, Lee, Jerry
Branao-an and Allen Mecham present in Mr. Mecham's
b
'
offi<.e. (TR 11, 33, 43, 106). At the time of that meeting,
it had not been decided which party would disassociate
from the corporation or how the disassociation was to be

3
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accomplished (TR 46, 47, 48, 69). This meeting was the
only time prior to the execution of Exhibit 1 that a
method ·of placing a value on the corporate stock was
discussed.
On the 23rd day of June, Mr. Mecham, attorney for
the corporation and a member of the Board of Directors
of Acme, wrote Mr. Lee in regard to his draws from the
corporation. (Exhibit 6). Mr. Jones testified that within
a few days after June 23, Mr. Lee drew another $450.00
and Mr. Mecham wrote another letter suggesting that he
(Mr. Lee) resign from the Board of Directors (TR 71 and

108).

Some time prior to July 22, (the agreement date)
Lee came to Mecham and advised him that an obligation
which both the parties had personally guaranteed to the
Stewarts and Greens on a stock purchase contract could
be assumed by Lee and Jones would be released from
any liability (TR 97). Mr. Mecham testified that when
he learned of that possibility he stopped at Mr. Jones'
home one evening to discuss the matter and this was the
first time Mecham thought it pos·sible for Lee to be the
survivor of the two (TR 97). That discussion between
Mecham and Jones was the beginning of the negotiations
which resulted in the drafting and execution of Memo.
randum of Understanding and Agreement (Exhibit 1).
At Mecham's suggestion, Mr. Jones prepared a list of
the things that he fe.lt he had coming and gave it to
Mecham so that the Memorandum could be drawn and
presented to Lee (TR 72, 73, 97). The document wa·s pre-
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pared by .Mecham and was later executed by the parties .
.Jones resigned as an officer and director of the corporation and terminated his employment with the company
which paid him a ·Salary of $18,000.00 per year.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN RULING
THE TERl\1 ''NET WORTH'' AS USED IN EXHIBIT
ONE WAS THE BOOK VALUE OF THE STOCK IN
DEFENDANT CORPORATION AS OF JULY 1, 1966.
The subject of the legal interpretation of contracts
and agreements has been classified into numerous rules
by the decisions, legal texts, and treatises through the
years. It now is only a matter of defining nature of the
problem to be resolved, selecting the 0orrect rules to be
applied to the problem, and then applying the rules to
the evidence to resolve the issue uetween the litigants.

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

In order to define the nature of the problem, it must
be determined what kind of a contract or agreement was
entered into between the parties. 3 Williston on Contracts
§604. Here we have a fully integrated written memorandum of understanding and agreement (Restatement of
Contracts §228) between three different parties, to wit:
.John P. Jones, Gordon Lee, and Acme Building Products,

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Inc., a corporation, (Exhibit 1). The expressed intention
of the parties in the writing is found in the three
"Whereas" clauses at the beginning of the document
which are as follows:
''Whereas both Messrs.Jones and Lee desire to
disassociate themselves in the conduct of the business known as Acme Building Products, Inc. and
''Whereas, Gordon Lee has indicated a willin"ness to continue the operations of Acme Buildi;g
Products, Inc., and John P. Jones has indicated
a willingness to disassociate himself fr.om said
business ; and,
''Whereas, it is agreed by both John P. Jones
and Gordon Lee that the income from Acme Building Products, Inc. can be used to purchase the net
worth value of the business accrued to the account
of J,ohn P. Jones."
This expressed intent of parties to the contract is controlling upon the court unless same is insufficient in
describing the intention of the parties. 17 Am Jr 2d 633,
Contracts §245. Ephraim Theater Company v. Hawk 7
Utah 2d 163, 321 P2d 221 (1958).
The district court was requested to interpret the
phrase ''net worth'' as used in the body of the agreement in paragraphs two and three which is quoted above.
The parties agreed that the words "net worth" were
ambiguous, in that they were susceptible to more than
one interpretation, and the court hearing was held to
determine the meaning of said words by the use of parol
evidence, if necessary.

6
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'l'herefore, the problem is one of interpreting the
11or<ls "net wort1" as used in paragraphs two and three
of the fully integrated written agreement '"herein the
parties have expressly stated their intentiolls and where
i! was agreed that the words 1Yere susceptiulc to more
! lian one interpretation.

THE RULES 'l'O BE APPLIED
Restatement of Contracts §230 states the rule to be
applied, or the standard of intorpretatio11, where there is
an integration.
"The standard of interpretation of an integration, except where it produces an ambiguous
result, or is excluded by a rule establishing a definite meaning, is the moaning that would be
attached to the integration by a reasonably intelligent person acquainted with all operative usages
and knowing all the cirC'umstanC'os prior to and
contemporaneous with the making of the integration, other than oral statements by the parties of
what they intended it to mean."
This standard of interpretation is tho primary
wurre when there is an integration as in tho case at hand.
'rho objective viewpoint of a third person is taken who
has knowledge of all operative usages as well as of other
accompanying cirrnmstances. Oral statements by the
parties of what they intended the written language to
moan are excluded even though such statements might
show the parties gave their words a meaning that would
not otherwise be apparent. Restatement of Contracts

§2:)0, Comment (a).
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Additional rules can be used to aid in the application
of the foregoing standard if necessary. These are found
in Restatement of Contracts §235 and 3 Williston §618.
Those applicable to the problem at hand are:
(a) Technical terms and words of art are given their
technical meaning unless the context or usage which
is applicable indicates a different meaning. Williston
states that this rule will yield if the application of
other primary rules show a contrary meaning. 3
Williston §618.
(b) The writing will be read as a whole, and every
part will be interpreted with reference to the whole;
and if possible, it will be so interpreted as to give
effect to its general purpose. In general, a word
used by the parties in one sense is to be interpreted
as employed in the same sense through out the writing in the absence of countervailing reasons. 3
Williston §618, Restatement of Contracts §235.
This Court has on numerous occasions adopted all
the foregoing rules of contract interpretation. See: Cornwall v. Willow Creek Co'Ulntry Club; 13 Utah 2d 160; 369
P2d 928 (1962), Ephraim Theater Company v. Hawk, 7
Utah 2d 163, 321 P2d 221 (1958); Maw v. Noble, 19 Utah
2d 440, 354 P2d 121 (1960); Vitagraph, Inc. v. American
Theatre Co. 77 Utah 76, 291 P2d 303 (1930); Mathis v.
Madsen, 1 Utah 2d 46, 261 P2d 952 (1953); Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. R. W. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d
288, 291 P2d 890 (1955), Plain City Irrigatio•n Co. v.
Hooper Irrigation Co., 11 Utah 2d 188, 356 P2d 625
(1960).

8
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APPLICATION OF THE RULES
'rhe net worth of a business has been defined as the
remainder after deduction of liabilities from assets.
Miner Inc. v. Peerless Equipment, 115 F2d 650, 7th Cir.
(1940), Castelli v. Tolibia, 83 NYS2d 554, Eastern Capital Corp. v. Freeman, Hi8 NYS2d 834 (1957). Both certified public accountants who testified agreed that in an
accounting sense net worth meant assets less liabilities
'
or stated another way, it is the capital account plus the
surplus account. However, the term net worth is not a
precise term, in that the use of the term itself does not
enable one to determine how the assets or what assets
would be valued (TR 38, 39, 59, 63, & 83). Therefore, net
worth i,s to some extent a technical term meaning assets
less liabilities, but without defining the term further, and
depending on the context and surrounding circumstances,
it can either mean the actual value of all assets of a company or the value of merely those assets carried by the
company on its books at the depreciated value or at some
other means of valuation. Principles of Accounting by
Finney and Miller, page 47.
Knowing foregoing accounting definition of "net
worth", our reasonably intelligent third person in Restatement of Oontracts §230 must also keep in mind the
sunounding circumstances prior to and contemporaneous
with the making of the agreement. All of the circumstanees cannot be cited here, but those of greatest importance are as follows:
(1) The parties, J.ones and Lee, each owned one-half

9
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of the outstanding stock in the corporation an<l hv
this writing they were atternpti11g to senorc thei,r
six and one-third year relationship.
(2) The withdrawing party, .Tones, was giYing 11p uo!
only his stock ownership in the eorporation, but also
his $18,000.00 per year position as president.
(3) The remaining party, Lee, would become the sole
stockholder in the corporation after the corporation
had purchased the stock owned by Jones.
( 4)
the
the
ing
the

The corporation's capital assets were carried on
corporation books at their depreciated value and
method of depreciation used was a double-declinbalance or accelerated method which depreciate>
assets faster in the first five years (TR 58).

( 5) The only discussion between the parties abou!
the term book value in attempting to set a buyout
price t·o·ok place sometime in May of 1966, an<l at that
time the negotiations had not yet been commenced
which rnsulted in the drafting of the agreement here
in question. This meeting with Jones, Lee, the C.P.A
Branagan, and Allen Mecham was one of a long
series ·of meetings and not in any way related to the
contents of said agreement (TR 43, 44, 46, 68 & 69).
(6) The withdrawing party, J•ohn P ..Jones, was told
by the author of the agreement, prior to its exerution,
to make a list of the items he would want in consideration for his withdrawing from the business. No discussions ever took place prior to the execution of the

10
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agreement as to what the words "net worth" as used
in paragraph three were intended to mean.
knowledge of the definition of "net worth"
and of the fore going circumstances, our reasionably intelligent third person should now be able to interpret the
words ''net worth'' as used in paragraph three of the
agreement. To conclude that the parties intended them to
mean the book value of the stock in the corporation produces a totally unrealistic and unreasonable result.
~With

It is interesting to note that the author of Exhibit 1
used the term net worth three different times. First, in
the third introductory paragraph:

"vVHEREAS, it is agreed by both John P.
Jones and Gordon Lee that the income from Acme
Building Products, Inc. can be used to purchase
the NET WORTH value of the business accrued
to the account of John P. Jones." (emphasis
added).
Second, in paragraph number two:
"\Vhen the foregoing releases are secured
and/or the events take place, and it is determined
the NET WORTH value applicable to the interest
in Acme Building Products, Inc. now owned by
John P. Jones, then John P. Jones will quit-claim
all right, title, and interest in any stock or intere~dt
in said Acme Building Products, Inc. to the sa1
corpora ti on.'' (emphasis added).
Third, in paragraph number three:
''As a con di ti on to the afore said Release of
all the interest in the business by John P. Jones,

11
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it is understood and agreed that a financial statement will be first drawn as of July 1, 1966, and
that Gordon Lee and John P. Jones, with the aid
of Jerry Branagan and Allen E. l'v[echam, will
negotiate. an_d enter into an Agreement whereby
Acme Bmldmg Products, Inc. will agree to pay
John P. Jones upon terms as set forth by John P.
J·ones as a result of said negotiation, the balance
due to him from an accounting which reflects the
NET WOR.TH of the said Acme Building Products, Inc.'' (emphasis added)
One of \Villiston 's rules of interpretation states:
'' ... In general, a word used by the parties in
one sense is to be interpreted as employed in the
same sense throughout the writing in the absence
of contervailing reasons." 3 Williston §618.

If the words net worth in paragraph three mean net
worth based upon the book value of the stock of the corporation, then they ·should als•o mean the same thing in
the third introductory paragraph and in paragraph two.
Such an interpretation cannot in any way be made without destroying the whole context of both usage·s of the
wo·rds.
The expressed intent of the parties is found within
the four corners of the instrument and that intent must
govern. Ephrairn Theatre Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d
163, 321 P2d 221 (1958). The parties were attempting to
sever their joint ownership of a going business and in
doing so the surviving party wa·s to pay to the departing
party, through the corporate facade, all of hi·s interest in
the business, not merely the hook value of his corporate
stock.

12
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rrhis court stated in Plain City Irrigation Company
v. Hooper Irrigation Company, 11 Utah 2d 188, 356 P2d
625, 628 (1960):
"Generally, where there is doubt about the
interpretation of a contract, a fair and equitable
result will be pref erred over a harsh or unreasonable one. And an interpretation that will produce
an inequitable result will be adopted only where
the contract so expressly and unequivocally so
pr·ovides that there is no other reasonable interpretation to be given to it."
If net worth in Paragraph 3 of Exhibit 1 is interpreted to mean net worth based upon book value of the
corporation as of July 1, 1966, the resulting consequences
to the withdrawing party is unreasonable. The assets of
the corporationwere being depreciated at an accelerated
rate and the actual or real value may exceed the depreciated value (TR 58). Therefore, Gordon Lee, as the
sole stockholder ·Of the corporation after the purchase of
John Jones' stock, could liquidate all the assets at their
market value, pay off the liabilities, and have a handsome win-all. Such a result was certainly not contemplated by the parties to the agreement. Whereas, such an
unreasonable result would not be possible if the withdrawing party were paid all of his interest based upon
the actual or real value of the corporate assets as contemplated by the agreement as a whole and specifically
paragraphs two and three which refer t 10 " . . . all right,
title, and interest in any stock or interest in ,said Acme
... '' and ''As a condition of the aforesaid Release of all

the interest in the business ... ''

13
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POINT II
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT RUL.
ING THAT THE TERM "NET WORTH" AS USED
IN EXHIBIT ONE MEANT THE ACTUAL NET
VALUE OF THE CORPORATION.
The fact that the instrument here in question was
poorly drawn does not relieve the court of its responsibility to ascertain its meaning if at all possible. Mathis v.
Madsen, 1 Utah 2d 46, 261 P2d 952 (1953). When
the meaning of ambiguous words in a contract can be
clarified by reference to other parts of the contract, or
where ambiguity arises by reason of the language used
and not because of extrinsic facts, the court must interpret the words as a matter of law. Paclawski v. Bristol
Laboratories, Inc. Okl, 425 P2d 452, 456 (1967).
An intergrated contract cannot he varied, modified,
or ciontradicted by parol evidence and its interpretation
is a question of law for the court. Pacific States Cast Iron
Pipe Co. v. Harsh Utah Corp. 5 Utah 2d 244, 300 P2d 610,
616 (1956).
Chief Justice Wolfe in Mat his v. Mads en, supra, at
page 956, adopting the trial court's memorandum decision ·stated:
"In searching for the meaning the court must
first examine the language used in the instrument
itself and accord to it the weight and effect which
the instrument itself may show that the parties
intended the words to hav·e. If then its meaning
is still ambiguous or uncertain, the court may con·
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sider other co_ntemporaneous writings concerning
the ,same subJect matter, and may, if still uncertain, consider parole evidence of the parties' intention.''
Applying the foregoing principals and those rules
stated in Point One herein, the trial court should have
concluded that ''net worth'' as used in the agreement
meant the actual net value of the corporation as opposed
to its ruling that it meant mere boiok value of the corporation's stock. The plaintiff was not merely selling stock
baek to a corporation; he was giving up all those things
that the stock he owned represented including an
$18,000.00 per year salary, rone-half ownership in a going
business which was making a profit at the time the transaction was entered into, one-half interest in the assets
owned by the corporation, and the attendant power to
determine the use to which those assets would be put to
bring him a return '0'11 his investment. None of these
items are taken into consideration in determining book
value of corporate stock. However, if the actual net value
of the corporation is used in determining what the plaintiff would receive fior all his interest in the corporation,
the basis of the bargain between the parties is more
realistically arrived at. Depreciated value of assets have
no relationship to the actual value of a corporation.
The Supreme Court of Iowa has been often cronfronted with an analogous situation in cases commenced
under a statute providing for the payment of the real
value .of the stock owned by a stockholder voting against
renewal of a corporate existence. In Woodward v. Quig-

15
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ley, Iowa, 133 N.,V. 2d 38 ( 1965) the court uses rnriou,
formulae and calculations to arrive at a figure whicl1
would represent the real value of descenting stock
holder's stock. The "net asset value" of the corporatio 11
was used in this determination. Sueh a method of evalua.
tion takes into consideration all those factors which must
necessarily be considered in arriving at an equitable price
for the stock. Such a method of evaluation could be used
in the case at hand to arrive at the real value of the
plaintiff's interest in Acme Building Products, Inc.

CONCLUSION

The trial court's finding that words "net worth" as
used in the Memorandum of Understanding and Agree·
ment meant the net worth of the corporation based upon
book value of the corporation is unreasonable when the
correct principals of contract interpretation are applied.
This court is respectfully requested to reverse the
trial court's holding and hold as a matter of law that the
words "net worth" as used in the agreement meant the
actual net value of the corporation.
Respectfully submitted,
BROWNING & YOCOM
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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